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EGYPT:  
The 
Importance of 
Choice 
Political intermediaries and democratization in Egypt after the Arab Spring 
 
How have Egypt’s institutions been affected by the 
fall of Hosni Mubarak?  
 
 
 
 Are they largely in tact? 
 
 Have they changed? 
 
 What are the implications? 
 
Research Question: 
In Egypt, the lack of a “clear, plausible, and 
critical governing alternative that threatens 
the governing coalition with replacement”* – 
i.e. ‘robust’ party competition – is causing the 
transition from authoritarianism to flounder.  
 
 
- Dominance of the FJP - 
 
 - Incoherent political opposition - 
 
 - Disillusioned, weak civil society - 
 
Thesis: 
*Anna Grzymala-Busse (2007) 
Role of Political Parties:  
 
Candidate selection, interest aggregation, policy formulation 
 
 
Connect people to the regime 
 
Facilitate accountability 
Political Parties and Dem Transitions 
 
“…elite continuity, party continuity, and elite and party 
discontinuity” (Morlino, 2002)   
 
Egypt: elite and party discontinuity 
 
Egypt 1952-2011: ‘Pillars’ of the State* 
 
>The Military 
 
>The Authoritarian System 
 
>“The religious world of al-Azhar” 
 
>Civil Society  
 
 
*Albrecht & Wegner (2006) 
 
 
The Egyptian President faces a “tangible 
legitimacy Problem” 
 
•  Lacks an inherent legitimacy 
•  Revolutionary ‘luster’ has worn off post-
Nasserism 
•  Legitimacy derived from elections and 
parliament  
  
Required dominance of parliament: 
  
•  Political parties are only allowed when 
they do not represent “strong social forces” 
 
Consequently, competition in Egypt takes 
place between the four pillars and not within 
parliament 
Competition in Egypt (Albrect and Wegner, 2006): 
Civil Society: Sources 
Main sources of political opposition:  
 <> The Muslim Brotherhood (banned as a political 
party) 
 <> Popular Protests 
 
The political party system in Egypt: 
 “…until 2011 consisted of a domineering, corrupt, and 
 creaky machine and a host of desiccated and  forgotten 
 organizations” (Brown, 2012) 
  
 
 
 
          
The “refusal” of the regime to allow for the 
development of political parties and many civil-
society associations, explains why 
Islamism was able to become such a 
dominant political force (Berman, 2013) 
 
Thus, the 
rise of…. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
1970s: 
 
• Leftist and secular national 
forces playing a larger role in 
opposition 
• MB in a period of rebuilding, 
supportive of Sadat’s intifah 
• Nasser’s legacy criticized as 
‘communist’, blamed for 1967 
‘setback’ 
  
1980s: 
 
• Rise of Gama’at Islamiyya, 
assassination of Sadat 
• Mubarak: ‘permissive 
repression’, toleration of 
‘informal activities’ 
• MB take over social welfare 
 
1990s: 
 
• ‘Violent elimination’, 
‘indiscriminate state 
repression’ 
• Why? 
• Gama’at Islamiyya severely 
weakened  
• MB left as ‘only significant 
trend’ of political Islam 
2000s: 
 
• ‘Practically hegemonic’ 
control of student unions, 
professional syndicates 
• Widespread support within 
urban poor, labor 
Civil Society: other sources? 
Trade unions: Mubarak Era, ETUF 
•  Since 1957 has functioned as an “arm of the 
 state” 
•  Elections rigged 
•  Oppositional elements banned 
•  No direct elections for executive committees  
•  Historically – limited to no right to strike 
 
Now: 
 
“Professional associations and labor unions 
are operating at cross-purposes, with 
some against the Morsi government, and others in 
support” 
 
(Brown, 2012) 
The Islamist ‘head start’ 
Elections  
First lower-house elections:  
 November-January 2011/12 
  
 Carter Center: “a broadly accurate 
 expression of the will of the voters” 
  
 (Results later rendered void by SCC) 
 
 ****Turnout: 54% overall 
 
 
First upper-house elections: 
 January-March 2012 
  
 “…characterized by a general lack of 
 interest” 
 
 ****Turnout: 14% (first-round), 7% 
(runoff)  
  
Elections in Egypt 2011-12 
Respondent 
Descriptions 
“…started too 
late in the 
process” 
Elections: Party differentiation 
– Non-Islamic opposition DEDI study (2012): 
‘democracy,’, 
‘human rights,’ 
‘people’s 
empowerment,’ 
‘social justice,’ 
and ‘national 
unity’… 
Many new parties, 
“…virtually unknown 
throughout the 
campaign process…” 
Lack of 
‘concrete’ 
economic 
and political 
platforms 
OVERALL: Failure to 
resonate with voters 
“…weak… in a 
disarray… [and] 
poorly 
organized…” 
Vague slogans Consequences  
Low substantive differentiation  
 
 
 
 
Clientelistic, particularistic and 
locally-oriented behavior  
 
 
 
 
High candidacy costs 
Vague, revolutionary 
campaign platforms 
 
 
 
FJP cooptation of tribes 
Particularistic benefits 
 
 
 
 
Major disparities in level of 
organization and resources 
 
  
 
Elections: campaign tactics 
“…which party 
best represent[s]… 
personal political, 
economic, and 
social views” 
Muslim 
Brotherhood/FJP:      
 3% 
Elections: Party differentiation 
Tessler,  
Jamal, Robbins, 2012 
“…recognize the 
leader of the 
FJP…” 
“…clarity of 
political 
platforms” 
34%: 
“nearly twice 
as many as 
for… al-Wafd” 
FJP: 15% 
Non-Islamist: 5-10% 
Benstead,  
Lust, et al., 2013 
Benstead,  
Lust, et al., 2013 
                Back to the ‘pillars’ 
Back to the streets…  
The constitution 
 
The court 
 
The military 
 
Presidential empowerment, 
coopt military, disempowers 
courts 
 
Pushes against the 
executive/legislature 
 
 
Strikes a ‘neutral’ stance 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Finding Choice – the ‘silent majority’ 
The ‘silent majority’ 
 -High voter apathy 
 -FJP vote bloc – 10 million people 
 -Incoherent opposition – party of ‘no’ 
  
38% of Egyptians* feel as though “their 
country is worse off than before the revolution” 
*(Benstead, Lust, et al., 2013) 
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